














This paper explores how processing trade, jointly with tariff reduction, can 
improve a firm's productivity. Tariff reductions generate productivity gain via 
competition, whereas processing export does so via spillovers. Using mostly 
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information and controlling for possible endogeneity, I found that a 10% 
tariff decrease generates a 12% increase in a firm's productivity gain. In 
addition, processing firms enjoy significant productivity gains via spillovers, 
with heterogeneity across firms divided according to ownership. These 
findings are robust to various econometric methods, disaggregated 
specifications, and measures. 
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This paper explores how processing trade, jointly with tari⁄reduction, can improve
a ￿rm￿ s productivity. Tari⁄ reductions generate productivity gain via competition,
whereas processing export does so via spillovers. Using mostly disaggregated Chinese
product-level trade data and ￿rm-level production data from 2000￿ 2006, after con-
structing ￿rm-level tari⁄s based on product information and controlling for possible
endogeneity, I found that a 10% tari⁄ decrease generates a 12% increase in a ￿rm￿ s
productivity gain. In addition, processing ￿rms enjoy signi￿cant productivity gains
via spillovers, with heterogeneity across ￿rms divided according to ownership. These
￿ndings are robust to various econometric methods, disaggregated speci￿cations, and
measures.
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This paper investigates the in￿ uence of processing trade and tari⁄ reductions on Chinese
￿rms￿productivity. Although the impact of tari⁄ reductions on a ￿rm￿ s productivity has
been widely explored in the literature, relatively little research has focused on the role of
processing trade, as a type of trade liberalization on intermediate goods.
Processing trade is a popular trade pattern in many developing countries (especially
China, Mexico, and Vietnam). A domestic ￿rm ￿rst obtains raw materials or intermedi-
ate inputs abroad and after some processing domestically it then exports the value-added
￿nal goods. To encourage processing trade, governments usually o⁄er tari⁄ reductions
or even tari⁄ exemptions on the processing of intermediate goods. In contrast to tari⁄
reductions, which could foster a ￿rm￿ s productivity by inducing tougher import competi-
tion, processing trade can introduce international knowledge spillovers and other learning
e⁄ects on domestic ￿rms. As a result, processing ￿rms usually enjoy more productivity
gains than those of non-processing ￿rms. The spillover e⁄ects can di⁄er according a ￿rm￿ s
ownership. In particular, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) are associated with high pro-
ductivity since they enjoy international spillovers. By contrast, state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) usually have low productivity since they are less e¢ cient.
In the past decade, China￿ s foreign trade has grown very fast. China has now replaced
Germany as the largest exporter in the world. Indeed, the processing export regime
jointly with FIEs has become the driving force of China growing exports. Within its
total trade volume, China￿ s processing trade has accounted for more than half since 1995.
Simultaneously, the share of total exports by FIEs has also increased dramatically, from
around 20% in 1992 to around 60% in 2006. China￿ s foreign direct investment as a share of
GDP once climbed to 6% in 1994 before plateauing at 3% (Naughton, 2006). In addition,
China obeyed to its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitment after 2001 and has
cut tari⁄s from 18.53% in 2001 to 8.87% in 2006. Finally, China￿ s average annual increase
1in total factor productivity (TFP) in the past two decades has been around 4%, although
this pace seems to have slowed down over time (Zheng et al., 2008).
Using the most disaggregated Chinese ￿rm-level production data and product-level
trade data, in this paper I unravel the two channels of raising productivity gains from
trade liberalization for processing ￿rms: the import competition e⁄ect via tari⁄reductions
and the learning e⁄ect via processing trade. In addition, I explore the processing ￿rm￿ s
heterogeneity on productivity gain across ￿rm types. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is one of the few studies to show that China￿ s tari⁄reductions generate productivity
gains via increased competition, whereas processing export does so via spillovers. These
results are found to be robust by using a variety of methodological assessments.
Firstly, I measure a ￿rm￿ s productivity in two ways. I ￿rst calculate the ￿rm￿ s TFP
by using the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach with some necessary modi￿cations and
extensions to ￿t with China￿ s reality. In this way, I am able to control for the simultaneity
bias and selection bias caused by the usual OLS estimates on the Solow residual associated
with TFP. Note that one of the important assumptions of the Olley￿ Pakes approach is that
capital is more aggressively responsive to unobserved productivity. However, one might
worry that China is a labor-abundant country and thereby labor costs are relatively low.
When facing a productivity shock, China￿ s ￿rms are more likely to adjust their labor input
to re-optimize their production behavior. This is consistent with the idea suggested by
Blomstr￿m and Kokko (1996) that labor embodies more productivity improvements than
capital does. Therefore, I adopt the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM approach as
an alternative way to measure a ￿rm￿ s TFP.
Secondly, in this paper China￿ s processing trade is broken down into several speci￿c
types, including processing trade with assembly and processing trade with imported ma-
terials. I delve into each type to explore the e⁄ects of tari⁄ reductions and the particular
type of processing trade on a ￿rm￿ s productivity gains. More importantly, the spillover
e⁄ect di⁄ers according to a ￿rm￿ s ownership. FIEs are associated with high productivity
2since they enjoy international spillovers. By contrast, SOEs usually have low productivity
since they are less e¢ cient. Interestingly, I ￿nd that FIEs involved in processing trade
have lower productivity than those not involved.
Thirdly, I mostly use disaggregated micro-level data to perform my estimations. Re-
searchers are usually suspicious of the quality of China￿ s aggregated-level data. Holz (2004)
stressed the bias of using China￿ s aggregated data because of the mismatch between dis-
aggregated and aggregated statistical data. Often owing to using Chinese industrial data,
￿ndings on China￿ s TFP growth are mixed and somewhat controversial. For example,
Young (2003) found that China￿ s TFP growth rate was modest and perhaps even nega-
tive in the post-Mao era. To avoid the drawback of using industrial data, in this paper I
use ￿rm-level production data to obtain a ￿rm￿ s capital, labor, and material intermediate
inputs and thereby calculate a ￿rm￿ s TFP. More importantly, based on the information
about a ￿rm￿ s product-level import value, I am able to construct a ￿rm-level tari⁄ index
to precisely measure a ￿rm￿ s exposure to foreign trade, which is much more accurate than
using an industrial-level tari⁄ as in many previous studies.
Finally, I adopt the instrumental variable (IV) approach to control for the possible
reverse causality of a ￿rm￿ s productivity growth on import tari⁄s. After controlling for
this endogeneity, I still ￿nd robust evidence that a 10% decrease in tari⁄s leads to a 12%
increase in a ￿rm￿ s productivity gain. In addition, processing ￿rms enjoy signi￿cantly
additional productivity gain via spillover e⁄ects.
This paper joins the growing literature on the nexus between trade liberalization and
productivity. To measure productivity, papers such as Tre￿ er (2004) emphasize labor pro-
ductivity, although most studies have concentrated on TFP. In the early stage, researchers
usually rely on industry-level data to measure TFP. These include, among others, Tybout,
de Melo, and Corbo (1991), Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), and Head and Ries (1999).
More recent studies, such as Pavcnik (2002) and Amiti and Konings (2007), consider ￿rm
productivity by using ￿rms￿data. In line with these works, I am able to take a step for-
3ward to explore the nexus between trade liberalization and productivity by using Chinese
plant(product)-level data.
There have been many studies on trade liberalization and productivity that cover both
developed and developing countries. The studies testing data on developed countries,
among others, include Bernard et al. (2006) for the United States and Tre￿ er (2004) for
Canada. But more evidence has been found in developing countries, such as Bustos (2009)
for Argentina, Scholr (2004) for Brazil, Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo (1991) and Pavcnik
(2002) for Chile, Harrison (1994) for Cote d￿ Ivoire, Krishna and Mitra (1998) for India,
Amiti and Konings (2007) for Indonesia, De Loecker (2007) for Slovenia, Iscan (2008) for
Mexico, and Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey.
Relatively few studies have assessed trade liberalization and ￿rm performance for China
despite it being the largest developing economy in the world. Je⁄erson et al. (1996) was
a pioneering work on China￿ s industrial TFP. Koopman et al. (2008) investigated how
much of Chinese exports really are made in China by modifying the formula of "vertical
speci￿cation" proposed by Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), and reconstructed the input￿
output tables to assess domestic value-added products. Lu et al. (2009) found that
Chinese exporters are less productive than non-exporters among foreign a¢ liates. Li and
Yu (2009) ascertained that Chinese ￿rms￿credit constraints and their productivities jointly
a⁄ect exports. Park et al. (2010) found that Chinese ￿rms whose export destinations
experience weaker currency depreciation have faster export growth. However, very few
studies, if any, have systematically explored the impact of trade liberalization on a ￿rm￿ s
productivity in China by using micro-level data. Thus, this paper provides novel evidence
to ￿ll in the gaps in the research.
This paper also enriches our understanding of the trade sources of productivity gains.
As concisely summarized by Amiti and Konings (2007), there generally exist three sources:
(1) Competition e⁄ects. With less trade barriers, domestic ￿rms face more import com-
petition and have to cut their markup and reduce their market shares. As a result, ￿rms
4have to make every e⁄ort to increase their productivity to survive (Helpman and Krugman,
1985). (2) Spillovers e⁄ects. The more exposure to foreign trade, the more likely ￿rms are
to enjoy international knowledge spillover. This could be through the incremental in￿ ow
of foreign direct investment (Keller and Yeaple, 2009), processing trade to import more
high quality intermediate goods, or learning by exporting (De Loecker, 2007). (3) Real-
location e⁄ects. By e¢ ciently reallocating input endowments, a ￿rm￿ s productivity can
signi￿cantly increase. Recently, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) argued that China would enjoy
an additional quarter of TFP gains if its capital and labor were reallocated e¢ ciently.
However, their estimations are based on aggregated data, and the heterogeneous e⁄ects
across and within industries still deserve further exploration. In this paper, I focus on the
￿rst two channels of productivity growth, but leave the last one for future research.
Like almost all other previous works, the measures of various non-tari⁄ barriers are
excluded from this analysis because of data unavailability. However, such a limitation
does not a⁄ect the results in this paper since my aim is not to explore the complete e⁄ect
of trade liberalization. Instead, my main interests are to explore how processing trade,
the new element of trade liberalization in China, as well as tari⁄ reductions a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s
productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces my econometric
method. Section 3 describes the data used in this paper. The main estimation results and
sensitivity analysis are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Econometric Methodology
In this section, I ￿rst introduce how to precisely measure TFP, followed by an empirical
investigation of the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on productivity.
52.1 Measures of TFP
The literature on TFP usually suggests using a Cobb￿ Douglas production function to









where Yit; Mit; Kit; Lit is ￿rm i￿ s output, materials, capital, and labor at year t, respec-
tively. Firm i￿ s productivity, ￿it; is a⁄ected by tari⁄s that it faced, ￿it, in year t. To
measure ￿rm￿ s TFP, one needs to estimate (1) by taking a log function ￿rst:
lnYit = ￿0 + ￿m lnMit + ￿k lnKit + ￿l lnLit + ￿it; (2)
Traditionally, TFP is measured by the estimated Solow residual between the true data on
output and its ￿tted value, ln ^ Yit. That is:
TFPit = lnYit ￿ ln ^ Yit: (3)
However, this approach su⁄ers from two problems: simultaneity bias and selection
bias. As ￿rst suggested by Marschak and Andrews (1944), at least some parts of TFP
changes could be observed by the ￿rm early enough for it to change its input decision
to maximize pro￿t. Thus, the ￿rm￿ s TFP could have reverse endogeneity in its input
factors. The lack of such a consideration would make the ￿rm￿ s maximized choice biased.
In addition, the ￿rm￿ s dynamic behavior also introduces selection bias. With international
competition, ￿rms with low productivity would die and exit the market, whereas those with
high productivity remain (Krugman, 1979; Melitz, 2003). In a panel dataset, the ￿rms
observed are those that have already survived. By contrast, ￿rms with low productivity
that collapsed and exited the market are excluded from the dataset. This means that
the samples covered in the regression are not randomly selected, which in turn causes
estimation bias.
1An alternative speci￿cation would be to use a trans-log production function, which also leads to similar
estimation results.
6Olley and Pakes (1996) provided an econometric methodology to deal with both the
simultaneity bias and selection bias in measured TFP. Since then, many researchers such
as De Locker (2007), Amiti and Konings (2007), and Keller and Yeaple (2009) among
others have modi￿ed and tailored their approaches to calculating TFP. Here, I adopt the
Olley￿ Pakes approach to estimating and calculating a ￿rm￿ s TFP with some extensions.
Firstly, I use an industrially de￿ ated price to measure TFP. Previous works such as
Felipe, Hasan, and McCombie (2004) stressed the estimation bias of using monetary terms
to measure output when estimating the production function. In that way, one actually
estimates an accounting identity.2 Secondly, I take China￿ s WTO accession in 2001 into
account since such a positive demand shock would push Chinese ￿rms to expand their
economic scales, which in turn can exaggerate the simultaneous bias of their measured
TFP. Similarly, following Amiti and Konings (2007), I also include a ￿rm￿ s export behav-
ior in calculating TFP by constructing a binary variable (one denotes export and zero
otherwise). The detailed procedure for the estimation of TFP is provided in Appendix A.
As discussed above, the augmented Olley￿ Pakes approach assumes that capital is more
aggressively responsive to an unobserved productivity shock than labor. However, this as-
sumption might not ￿t very well with China since it is a labor-abundant country. Firms
might prefer to adjust their labor to re-optimize their production behavior rather than
capital. I then use the Blundell￿ Bond (1998) system GMM approach to handle this po-
tential empirical challenge. By assuming that the unobserved productivity shock depends
on ￿rm￿ s previous period realizations, the system GMM approach models TFP to be af-
fected by all types of a ￿rm￿ s inputs in both current and past realizations.3 In particular,
2To gain a precise measure of TFP, ideally one should rely on product-speci￿c prices to calculate the
"physical productivity" (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2005). However, as many other studies, the
prices of all of a ￿rm￿ s products are unavailable in my data. As a compromise, I use the industrial price
to de￿ ate the ￿rm￿ s output.
3Note that ￿rst-di⁄erence GMM introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) also allows a ￿rm￿ s output to
depend on its past realization. However, such an approach would lose the instruments for the factor inputs
because the lag of output and factor inputs are correlated with past error shocks and the autoregressive
error term. By contrast, by assuming that the ￿rst di⁄erence of instrumented variables is uncorrelated with
7this model has a dynamic representation as follows:
lnyit = ￿1 lnLit + ￿2 lnLi;t￿1 + ￿3 lnKit + ￿4 lnKi;t￿1 + ￿5 lnMit
+￿6 lnMi;t￿1 + ￿7 lnyi;t￿1 + &i + ￿t + !it; (4)
where &i is ￿rm i￿ s ￿xed e⁄ect and ￿t is year-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect. The idiosyncratic term
!it is serially uncorrelated if there is no measurement error.4One can obtain consistent
estimates of the coe¢ cients in (12) by using a system GMM approach (Blundell and
Bond, 1998). The idea is that labor and material inputs are not taken as exogenously
given. Instead they are allowed to be changed over time as capital grows. Although the
system GMM approach still faces a technical challenge to control for the selection bias
when a ￿rm exits, it is still worthwhile using it to estimate a ￿rm￿ s TFP as a robustness
check.
2.2 Estimation Framework
In this section, I consider an empirical framework as follows:
TFPOP
it = ￿0 + ￿1￿it + ￿2PEit + ￿Xit + $i + ￿t + ￿it; (5)
where TFPOP
it is ￿rm i￿ s Olley-Pakes type TFP in year t whereas ￿it denotes ￿rm i￿ s
product value-weighted tari⁄ in year t. PEit is a dummy of a processing ￿rm to measure
whether or not ￿rm i is involved in processing trade (either import or export) in year t.5
Here ￿1 measures the import competition e⁄ect among ￿rms and thereby is expected to
be negative. By contrast, ￿2 measures the learning e⁄ects such as technological spillovers
via processing trade and thereby is anticipated to be positive. Xit denotes other control
the ￿xed e⁄ects, the system GMM approach can introduce more instruments and thereby dramatically
improve e¢ ciency.
4As discussed by Blundell and Bond (1998), even if there is a transient measurement error in some of the
series (i.e., !it~MA(1)), the system GMM approach can still reach consistent estimates of the coe¢ cients
in (6).
5As introduced before, there are many types of processing trade. Here, a processing ￿rm is de￿ned as
a ￿rm that involves any type of processing of imports/exports.
8variables for ￿rm i in year t such as its markup, the industrial markup, Her￿ndahl index,
capital utilization, and its type of ownership. Traditional wisdom believes that SOEs have
a relatively low economic e¢ ciency and thereby lower productivity. By contrast, FIEs have
higher productivity possibly because of their superior international technology spillover
(Keller and Yeaple, 2009) or lower ￿nancial constraints (Li and Yu, 2009). Therefore, I
construct two dummies to measure the roles of SOEs and FIEs.
Furthermore, if ￿rms in less concentrated sectors have weaker monopolistic power to
charge a higher markup, they would exert every e⁄ort to improve their e¢ ciency and
thereby chances of survival. To ascertain that tari⁄ reductions do not just pick up the
residual competition e⁄ect in initially lesser concentrated industries, I include the three
following control variables with a one-year lag to isolate any possible side e⁄ects: (1) a
￿rm￿ s markup, de￿ned as the ￿rm￿ s sales over its sales minus pro￿ts as in Nickell (1996)
and Keller and Yeaple (2009); (2) industrial markup, which is identical to a ￿rm￿ s markup
except in each Harmonized System (HS) two-digit sector; and (3) a Her￿ndahl concentra-
tion index, which is the sum of the squared market share at the HS two-digit level.
Finally, I add the extent of a ￿rm￿ s capital utilization, de￿ned as its logarithm of the
capital/labor ratio, into my estimations to control for the possible endowment e⁄ect on
TFP realization. The error term is divided into three components: (1) ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed
e⁄ects $i to control for time-invariant factors such as a ￿rm￿ s location; (2) year-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ects ￿t to control for ￿rm-invariant factors such as Chinese RMB real appreciation;
and (3) an idiosyncratic e⁄ect ￿ijt with normal distribution ￿ijt s N(0;￿2
ij) to control for
other unspeci￿ed factors.
3 Data
To completely investigate the impact of trade liberalization on a ￿rm￿ s productivity, in this
paper I rely on the following three highly disaggregated large panel datasets: disaggregated
tari⁄s data, ￿rm-level production data, and product-level trade data.
93.1 Firm-Level Production Data
The sample used in this paper comes from a rich ￿rm-level panel dataset that covers
around 162;885 in 2000 to 301;961 in 2006. The data are collected and maintained by
China￿ s National Bureau of Statistics in an annual survey of manufacturing enterprises.
It contains complete information on the three major accounting statements (i.e., balance
sheet, pro￿t & loss account, and cash ￿ ow statement). Brie￿ y, it covers two types of
manufacturing ￿rms ￿all SOEs and non-SOEs ￿whose annual sales are more than ￿ve
million RMB.6 The dataset includes more than 100 ￿nancial variables listed in the main
accounting statements of all these ￿rms.7
Although this dataset contains rich information, some samples are noisy and thereby
misleading, largely because of misreporting by some ￿rms.8 Following Je⁄erson et al.
(2008), I clean the sample and omit outliers by using the following criteria. First, obser-
vations whose key ￿nancial variables (such as total assets, net value of ￿xed assets, sales,
and gross value of industrial output) are missing were dropped. Secondly, the number of
employees hired for a ￿rm had to be no less than 10 people.9
Following Cai and Liu (2009) and Li and Yu (2009), I delete observations according
to the basic rules of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles if any of the following
are true: (1) liquid assets are higher than total assets; (2) total ￿xed assets are larger
than total assets; (3) the net value of ￿xed assets is larger than total assets; (4) the
￿rm￿ s identi￿cation number is missing; or (5) there is an invalid established time (e.g., the
opening month is later than December or earlier than January).
6Indeed, aggregated data on the industrial sector in the annual China￿ s Statistical Yearbook by the
Natural Bureau of Statistics are compiled from this dataset.
7Holz (2004) o⁄ers careful scrutiny on the possible measurement problems when using Chinese data,
especially at the aggregated level.
8For example, information on some family-based ￿rms, which usually have no formal accounting system
in place, is based on a unit of one RMB, whereas the o¢ cial requirement is a unit of 1000 RMB.
9Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest covering all Chilean plants with at least 10 workers. Here, we
follow their criterion.
103.2 Product-Level Trade Data
The extremely disaggregated product-level trade data was obtained from China￿ s General
Administration of Customs. It records a variety of useful information for each trading
￿rm￿ s product list including their trading price, quantity and thereby value at the HS
eight-digit level. The number of trade transactions in each year is reported in the ￿rst
row of Panel A in Table 1. Equally importantly, this rich dataset not only includes both
import and export data but also breaks down to many speci￿c types of processing trade.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
China￿ s processing trade has accounted for more than 50% of total trade volume since
1995. Although it covers around 16 speci￿c types of processing trade in China according to
the reports by the General Administration of Customs, two of them are more important:
processing export with assembly and processing export with imported materials. For
the ￿rst type, a domestic Chinese ￿rm obtains raw materials and parts from its foreign
trading partners without payment. However, after some domestic processes, the ￿rm
has to sell its products to a designated ￿rm. By contrast, for processing exports with
imported materials, a domestic Chinese ￿rm imports raw materials from abroad. With
some domestic processes, it can then sell its ￿nal goods elsewhere abroad. The ￿rst type
was more popular in the 1980s since most Chinese ￿rms lacked the capital to be able to
import. The second type has become more popular in China since the 1990s.
Table 2 reports a simple statistical summary for Chinese product-level trade data by
shipment and year. Overall, when focusing on the most disaggregated HS eight-digit level,
around 40% of the 17,170,641 observations are ordinary trade, whose exports account for
24% of China￿ s total exports during 2000￿ 2006. This suggests that the average trade
volume of ordinary trade is less than that of processing trade. Within the remaining 60%
of observations of processing trade, around 9%, which account for 11% of China￿ s total
export shares, are processing export with assembly (code: 14).
11China has not separately reported processing export with imported materials in this
dataset after its accession to the WTO in 2001. This type is classi￿ed into other types
of processing trade (code: 99), which account for more than 55% of total trade volume.
However, even though processing trade with imported materials only has two-year obser-
vations, it still accounts for another 10% of total trade volume. To precisely measure the
di⁄erence between the two, I focus on their di⁄erences in these two-year observations (i.e.,
2000 and 2001). Finally, Table 2 shows that China￿ s total trade volume has increased over
the years with the exception of 2006, largely because of the RMB revaluation in 2005 (Yu,
2009).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
3.3 Disaggregated Tari⁄s Data
Tari⁄s data can be accessed directly from the WTO.10 China￿ s tari⁄s data are available
at the HS six-digit disaggregated level for the period 2000￿ 2007.11 For each commodity
the following variables are available: number of ad valorem (AV) duty and non-AV duty;
average, minimum, and maximum AV duties; percentage of duty free; and even the bound
duty. Given that the product-level trade data are at the HS eight-digit level. I ￿rst merge
the tari⁄ dataset into the product-level trade data. Since my interest is to measure the
average e⁄ect of trade liberalization on a ￿rm￿ s productivity, I use average AV duty to
measure trade liberalization.
Table 3 reports the clustered HS two-digit AV duty (￿) from 2000-2006. Of the 15
clustered categories, textiles and garments (code: 50￿ 63) have the highest average import
tari⁄s followed by footwear and headgear (64￿ 67). By contrast, mineral products (25￿ 27)
and machinery and electrical products (84￿ 85) have relatively low import tari⁄s.
10http://tari⁄data.wto.org/ReportersAndProducts.aspx
11There are no data from 2000, but data from 1996 and 1997 are available. Since China did not experience
dramatic tari⁄ reductions between 1997 and 2000, I have used the 1997 tari⁄s to serve as a proxy of those
in 2000.
12[Insert Table 3 Here]
Since the main interest of this paper is to explore the e⁄ect of tari⁄s on a ￿rm￿ s
productivity, it is important to properly measure the tari⁄ level faced by ￿rms given that
each might import multiple products. Here, I construct a product weighted tari⁄ index










where the ratio in the parenthesis measures the weight of product k based on its trading
value (m). By clustering the HS two-digit industries into the 15 categories as above, I
then also report a ￿rm￿ s average duty in Table 3. Within each category, the average
￿rm￿ s duty is smaller than the average product duty. The economic rationale behind this
observation is that ￿rms produce more products with lower tari⁄s. One possible reason
is that, when facing tougher import competition, ￿rms attempt to improve quality and
thereby the value of their products.12Nevertheless, both industry-level and ￿rm-level tari⁄s
have declined over the years.
3.4 Data Manipulation and Measures
It is of great help for researchers to understand Chinese ￿rms￿production and trading
behavior with these three datasets at hand. However, researchers immediately face prac-
tical di¢ culties when combining product-level trade data with ￿rm-level production data.
Although these two datasets share a common variable (i.e., the ￿rm￿ s identi￿cation num-
ber), the coding system in each is completely di⁄erent. In particular, the ￿rm￿ s codes in
the product-level trade data are at an 11-digit level, whereas those in the ￿rm-level pro-
duction data are at a nine-digit level with no common elements inside. Without a common
variable, the two separate datasets cannot work together. To ￿x this problem, I rely on
12Note that ￿rm-level average duties in industries such as animals (01￿ 05), vegetables (06￿ 15), and food
(16￿ 24) are much lower than product-level average duties. However, my estimations do not cover these
agricultural sectors given that ￿rm-level production datasets only cover manufacturing ￿rms.
13other common variables to identify ￿rms. Appendix B describes the detailed practical
technique and procedure of measuring such data sets.13
Table 1 clearly demonstrates that each ￿rm trades multiple products with their trading
partners. Noteworthy, more than 60 million monthly transaction during 2000-2006 are
traded by only 654;352 ￿rms. After this rigorous ￿lter, there are 218,024 valid ￿rms
remaining between 2000 and 2006, which account for 34% of the 640,352 trading ￿rms
in the sample. Turning to the ￿rm-level production dataset, after deleting observations
without valid common merging variables, this number reduces to 973,207. Following the
same ￿ltering process as before, I then obtain 433,273 ￿rms over the same period, which
account for 44.5% of the 973,207 production ￿rms in the sample.
I then merge the datasets of both the product-level trade data and ￿rm-level production
data. I obtain 31,393 common trading ￿rms together, which accounts for only around 15%
of the valid ￿rms in the product-level trade dataset and around 8% of the valid ￿rms in
￿rm-level production dataset. This observation indicates two important phenomena about
China￿ s exporting distribution.
First, exporting ￿rms in the sample, on average, export more than those out of the
sample. The remaining 8% of large ￿rms (4.8% exporting ￿rms and 3.2% importing
￿rms14), implies that more than 90% of large ￿rms do not trade internationally. Such
a proportion might have an underestimation bias because of missing information on the
two identi￿ers in the sample. Li and Yu (2009) found that around 27% of all large (or
"above scale") ￿rms exported in 200￿ 0￿ 2007. By dropping observations in 2007, I ￿nd that
the proportion of large exporting ￿rms is stable (around 24% over 2000￿ 2006). However,
although my sample includes only around 21% of large exporting ￿rms15, their total export
volumes still account for more than 45% of total exports for all large exporting ￿rms in
13Interested Readers can contact me for this appendix.
14Note that a ￿rm could be involved with processing trade with both exporting and importing behavior.
Here, exporting ￿rms simply work with a ￿rm with exporting activities, if any. Similarly, importing ￿rms
merely indicate a ￿rm with any importing activities.
15That is, 4.8%/24%=21%.
14China.
Secondly, most trading ￿rms in China are small. As suggested by data from the General
Administration of Customs, during 2000￿ 2006 there were 218,024 trading ￿rms but only
31,393 of them were large. That is, more than 85% of trading ￿rms were below the "scale
level" (i.e., annual sales of less than 5 million RMB or around $730,000).16
Finally, Table 1 also o⁄ers information on merging a ￿rm￿ s entry and exit during 2000￿
2006. Clearly, more ￿rms entered than exited before the RMB revaluations in 2005 and a
reverse trend occurred after that.
3.5 Statistical Summary
Table 4 summarizes the estimates of the Olley￿ Pakes input elasticity of Chinese plants at
the HS two-digit level. I ￿rst cluster the 97 HS two-digit industries into 15 categories and
calculate their estimated probabilities and input elasticities. The estimated ￿rm￿ s survival
probability in the next year varies from 0.977 to 0.996 with a mean of 0.994, which suggests
that ￿rm exits were less severe in the sample during this period.17
Table 4 then presents the di⁄erence of the estimated coe¢ cients for labor, materials,
and capital by using both the Olley￿ Pakes methodology and the system GMM approach.18
The last row of Table 4 suggests that, on average, the Olley￿ Pakes approach has a higher
elasticity of capital (￿OP
k = :117;￿GMM
k = :001), whereas the system GMM approach has
a higher elasticity of labor (￿OP
l = :052;￿GMM
l = :240). Summarizing all the estimated
elasticities, the implied scale elasticities are .989 by using the Olley￿ Pakes approach,19
which is close to the constant returns-to-scales elasticities.20 Turning to the comparison
16Note that the ￿rm-level production dataset also includes small and medium-sized SOEs.
17Note that here ￿rm exits mean a ￿rm either stopped trading and exited the market or simply had
an annual sales ￿gure that was lower than the "large scale" amount (i.e., 5 million sales per year) and
dropped from the dataset. Owing to the restriction of the dataset, I am not able to distinguish the
di⁄erence between the two.
18Here, I use the original book value of ￿xed assets to estimate TFP. However, using the net value of
￿xed assets (after depreciation) does not change my results.
19Calculated as :052 + :582 + :117 = :989 by using the Olley-Pakes approach.
20Note that here I use the industrial de￿ ator as a proxy of a ￿rm￿ s price. Indeed, it is even possible that
15between the OLS and Olley￿ Pakes approaches, the estimates suggest that the usual OLS
approach has a downward bias (TFPOLS = :958;TFPOP = 1:188) largely because of the
lack of control for simultaneity bias and selection bias.
Finally, for a cross-country comparison of Olley￿ Pakes estimates, my estimation results
suggest that the intermediate inputs (i.e., materials) for Chinese ￿rms are more important
than those for American ￿rms estimated by Keller and Yeaple (2009), or for Indonesian
￿rms estimated by Amiti and Konings (2007), but the elasticity of capital input is less
important than its counterparts in the US or Indonesia. This implies that processing trade
indeed plays a signi￿cant role in China￿ s productivity growth, which will be explored in
detail shortly.
Table 5 reports the statistical summary of some key variables for estimations. Its upper
module presents HS eight-digit product-level information. Of the 16;262;159 monthly




ijt, has a mean of
.006 and thereby the average ￿rm￿ s weighted duty is .072. The tari⁄s slightly decline to
.067 when clustered at the ￿rm-year level as shown in the bottom module of Table 5.
As introduced above, FIEs are associated with high productivity and SOEs with low
productivity ceteris paribus. The ￿rm-level production dataset o⁄ers information on a
￿rm￿ s type. I ￿rst construct a dummy for foreign-invested ￿rms (Foreignit) if the ￿rm
has any investment abroad. A caveat here is that the dummy excludes investment from
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (H/M/T) since they are classi￿ed as ￿ out of border￿
investment rather than foreign investment. However, as emphasized by Feenstra and
Hanson (2004), China￿ s re-export from Hong Kong has a special place within China￿ s
foreign trade. Therefore, I consider, as a robustness check, a broad classi￿cation of FIEs
(FIEit) if a ￿rm receives any investment from Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan (H/M/T)-
Chinese ￿rms might exhibit the increasing returns-to-scales property in the new century if using the ￿rm￿ s
actual prices to calculate the "physical" productivity. This is a future research topic provided that such
data are available.
16owned ￿rms.21As shown in the bottom module of Table 5, around one-third of trading
￿rms are classi￿ed as FIEs by the narrow de￿nition but around two-thirds are classi￿ed
as FIEs by the broad de￿nition. At ￿rst glance, these ratios are much higher than their
counterparts (around 10%) reported in other studies. For example, Li and Yu (2009)
found around 10% of FIEs within the whole "above scale" ￿rms for 2000￿ 2007. However,
this is simply because ￿rms covered in the present paper are "above scale" trading ￿rms
only. Those non-trading "above scale" ￿rms have been excluded accordingly.
Similarly, the dummy for SOEs is one if a ￿rm has any investment from the states and
its operation scales are larger than the "above scale" threshold, and zero otherwise.22 To
avoid missing the role of small and medium-sized ￿rms, I also include SOEs with annual
sales lower than 5 million RMB to construct a broad de￿nition of SOEs as well. Around
2% of large trading ￿rms in the sample are SOEs.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Benchmark Results
As shown in Figure 1, a ￿rm￿ s tari⁄s have declined over 2000￿ 2006. Simultaneously, a
￿rm￿ s TFP has exhibited an increasing trend over this period. This observation implies
that there is a negative correlation between tari⁄ reductions and a ￿rm￿ s productivity.
Hence, I explore such a nexus between the two in this section.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
21Speci￿cally, FIEs include the following ￿rms: foreign-invested joint-stock corporations (code: 310),
foreign-invested joint venture enterprises (320), fully FIEs (330), foreign-invested limited corporations
(340), H/M/T joint-stock corporations (code: 210), H/M/T joint venture enterprises (220), fully H/M/T-
invested enterprises (230), and H/M/T-invested limited corporations (340).
22By the o¢ cial de￿nition reported in the China City Statistical Yearbook (2006), SOEs include ￿rms
such as domestic SOEs (code: 110); state-owned joint venture enterprises (141); state-owned and collective
joint venture enterprises (143), but exclude state-owned limited corporations (151).
17Table 6 reports the benchmark pooling OLS estimation results for this unbalanced
panel for 31,393 ￿rms from 2000￿ 2006.23 Column (1) includes the two essential variables
as regressors: a ￿rm￿ s weighted tari⁄s (￿it) and the dummy of processing ￿rms (PEit). The
e⁄ect of a ￿rm￿ s import tari⁄s on its TFP is signi￿cantly negative, which suggests that tari⁄
reductions signi￿cantly foster a ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency by inducing tougher import competition.
The signi￿cantly positive coe¢ cient of the dummy of processing ￿rms (^ ￿2=:015) creates
an impression that processing ￿rms are associated with high productivity.
Classical trade theory predicts that labor-abundant countries export labor-intensive
products. If this is true, ￿rms in labor-abundant industries (or ￿rms with a relatively rich
labor endowment) would export more. Coincidentally, ￿rms with high productivity are
associated with more exports (Bernard et al., 2006). Hence, it seems reasonable to expect
that a Chinese ￿rm￿ s capital utilization, measured as its logarithm of the capital/labor
ratio, is negatively correlated to a ￿rm￿ s productivity. Therefore, I include a ￿rm￿ s capital
utilization in Column (2) to control for such a possible correlation. Column (2) also
controls for other factors that might a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s import competition due to its industrial
market structure status quo ante, and still ￿nds that tari⁄ reductions lead to productivity
gains.
Previous work also suggests that SOEs have relatively low productivity compared
with non-SOEs because of their low e¢ ciency and impotent incentive systems (Wu, 2005).
Therefore, I add a dummy of SOEs as a control variable after the ￿rst column. It turns
out that the coe¢ cients of SOEs are all signi￿cantly negative. Such a ￿nding is broadly
consistent with Je⁄erson et al. (2000), who found that Chinese SOEs have a relatively
low TFP compared with private ￿rms in China.
Finally, it is somehow controversial among professionals in China to select a cuto⁄
stock share to identify whether or not a ￿rm is a FIE. To avoid such possible confusion,
here I simply use a dummy to isolate a ￿rm receiving foreign investment from one not.
23The total size of my sample for estimation is 101,292 since some observations have missing TFP values.
18In particular, I consider two di⁄erent de￿nitions of a FIE dummy. In a narrow category,
FIEs are de￿ned as ￿rms receiving foreign investment except that from H/M/T. By con-
trast, a broad de￿nition of the FIE dummy includes investment from H/M/T. Column (2)
shows that FIEs are positively associated with high productivity. More importantly, the
estimates in Columns (3) and (4) show that, including foreign investment from H/M/T,
FIEs are associated with more productivity growth, in terms of economic magnitude.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
If both processing ￿rms and FIEs have higher productivity, it is worthwhile asking
whether those FIEs involved in processing trade have higher productivity. Therefore, I
include two more interaction terms between FIEs/SOEs and processing ￿rms in Column
(3). Interestingly, the interaction term between FIEs and processing ￿rms is signi￿cantly
negative, whereas that between SOEs and processing ￿rms is signi￿cantly positive, which
suggests that non-processing FIEs have higher productivity than processing FIEs, and
that the reverse holds for non-processing SOEs. The economic rationale is as follows.
Since SOEs usually have lower e¢ ciency, they would like to work with processing trade to
gain technological spillovers e⁄ects. As a result, processing SOEs have higher productivity
than non-processing SOEs. By contrast, most FIEs have high productivity status quo ante.
Only those with lower productivity are more eager to involve with processing activity and
gain additional spillovers from trade. Finally, I add an additional interaction term between
FIEs and its log capital/labor ratio to see whether FIEs are more capital-abundant than
non-FIEs. The estimated coe¢ cient for this interaction term is negative but insigni￿cant.
Nevertheless, a ￿rm￿ s tari⁄s are shown to signi￿cantly negatively correlate to its TFP,
whereas processing ￿rms have higher productivity.
Columns (5)￿ (7) are the two-way ￿xed e⁄ects estimations. As mentioned above, some
time-invariant factors such as a ￿rm￿ s location can a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s productivity but are not
explicitly controlled in the OLS estimates in Columns (1)￿ (4). Firms on the eastern coast
19usually have higher productivity since they are closer to the sea and thereby have lower
transport costs when involved with foreign trade. Similarly, the ignorance of other time-
variant but ￿rm-insensitive factors such as RMB appreciation can bias the OLS estimates.
The ￿rm-speci￿c and time-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects can e¢ ciently control for such factors. It
turns out that the estimated coe¢ cients for the two variables, ￿rm￿ s tari⁄ and processing
dummy, again have anticipated signs. In addition, their economic magnitudes are close to
their counterparts obtained by the OLS estimates in Columns (1)￿ (4).
4.2 Estimates by Industry
In my sample, a ￿rm￿ s productivity is shown to be signi￿cantly heterogeneous across
di⁄erent industries. In particular, industries such as tobacco and cereals (HS code: 24 &
10) have a much higher TFP than industries such as ceramic products and arms (HS code:
69 & 93). By deleting the two outliers with the highest and lowest industrial productivities,
Figure 2 clearly demonstrates that, overall, industries with low import tari⁄s have high
productivity. However, as shown in Table 3, the variation of a ￿rm￿ s weighted tari⁄ by
industry is sizable. For instance, textiles and garments (HS code: 50￿ 63) have much higher
tari⁄s than those in the machinery and electrical industries (HS code: 84 & 85). Therefore,
I further explore the heterogeneous e⁄ects of tari⁄ reductions on a ￿rm￿ s productivity by
industry.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Columns (1) and (2) ￿rst report the OLS and ￿xed e⁄ect estimation results by exclud-
ing the two outliers with the highest and lowest industrial productivities. The estimated
coe¢ cients are very close to their counterparts in Columns (4) and (7) of Table 6. Since
high-tech industries (i.e., telecommunication) are usually expected to have high productiv-
ity, I omit the other industries and run regressions on Columns (3) and (4). The estimation
results suggest that tari⁄ reductions again signi￿cantly foster a ￿rm￿ s productivity. More
20importantly, their economic magnitude is much higher than their counterparts in Columns
(1) and (2), which cover all industries. However, processing ￿rms in high-tech industries
are also positively, although insigni￿cantly, associated with a ￿rm￿ s productivity.
The rest of Table 7 investigates the textiles and garments industry, the one with the
highest tari⁄s, and the machinery industry, the one with the lowest tari⁄s. Each estimated
coe¢ cient has the same sign as previous estimates. Turning to the economic magnitude,
the coe¢ cients of a ￿rm￿ s tari⁄ in the machinery industry are much higher than those in
the textiles and garments industry, which suggest that ￿rms in the former bene￿t much
more from tari⁄ reductions. One possible reason is these ￿rms face far tougher import
competition given China has a huge intra-industry trade in machinery, as reported by
China￿ s General Administration of Customs.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
4.3 Speci￿cations of Periodic Di⁄erences
To reduce the estimation bias caused by unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity, the estimates in
Tables 6 and 7 control for the ￿rm-speci￿c and year-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects by adopting the
￿rm￿ s annual data. However, some unobserved factors would still change according to the
￿rm and year. One possible example is that taxation reduction policies in special economic
zones vary by year, a⁄ecting the productivity of ￿rms based in these zones. The regular
two-way ￿xed e⁄ects estimation seems unable to fully control for this omitted variable
problem.
To address this empirical challenge, I consider alternative econometric speci￿cations
by taking periodic di⁄erences. In Column (1) of Table 8, I take the ￿rst di⁄erence for both
the ￿rm￿ s tari⁄and processing ￿rms as well as the dummy of FIEs and SOEs. It turns out
that both tari⁄s and the processing dummy still have anticipated coe¢ cients, although
insigni￿cantly for the processing dummy. I suspect that this insigni￿cance is because of
the above naive speci￿cation. Column (2) o⁄ers a complete speci￿cation and ￿nds that the
21processing dummy is signi￿cantly positive. Similarly, estimates of the second and third
periodic di⁄erences have the same qualitative ￿nding.
The only surprising ￿nding is that the coe¢ cients of FIEs and the interaction term
with processing ￿rms changes their signs in all periodic speci￿cations. However, these
signs are all insigni￿cant in the conventional statistical sense.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
4.4 Alternative Measures on Productivity
To enrich the understanding of the nexus between a ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency and tari⁄ reductions,
TFP is re-measured by the system GMM approach. In this way, the role of capital will not
be overemphasized in China. By covering all industries in the sample, the OLS and ￿xed
e⁄ect estimates in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 reveal similar ￿ndings to their coun-
terparts in Tables 6 and 7 in which TFP is measured by using the Olley￿ Pakes approach.
In particular, processing ￿rms are shown to have higher productivity than non-processing
￿rms.
If processing trade can boost a ￿rm￿ s productivity via spillovers, we should expect
that assembly, as one of the most important types of processing trade, would exhibit this
feature as well. The positive coe¢ cient of the processing dummy shown in Columns (3)
and (4) ascertains this conjecture. However, it is possible that, during the period inves-
tigated, some ￿rms previously involved with processing trade might no longer obtain raw
materials abroad but purchase intermediate goods only from domestic market. Similarly,
it is also possible that some non-processing ￿rms switch to processing trade. Although
I have captured these possible switching behaviors by choosing a time-variant dummy of
processing trade, it is still worthwhile exploring the speci￿c feature of non-switching ￿rms
only. Column (5), therefore, reports the OLS estimates for the non-switching ￿rms (i.e.,
processing dummy here means that a ￿rm has always been a processing ￿rm) during this
period. Again, tari⁄ reductions are shown to signi￿cantly boost a ￿rm￿ s productivity and
22processing ￿rms have higher productivity.
Thus far, all estimates reveal that processing ￿rms have higher productivity than non-
processing ￿rms because of spillovers e⁄ects. However, it is interesting to ask whether
processing ￿rms, compared with non-processing ￿rms, gain more from tari⁄ reductions
because of the import competition e⁄ects. Therefore, I include an interaction term between
the ￿rm￿ s tari⁄s and processing dummy in the last column of Table 9. After controlling
for the two-way ￿xed e⁄ects, such an interaction term is shown to have a signi￿cantly
negative e⁄ect. This clearly suggests that, in addition to the spillovers, processing ￿rms
bene￿t from import competition.
Turning to other variables, in all the estimations in Table 9, FIEs are shown to have
higher productivity than non-FIEs, but the interaction term with processing ￿rms are
signi￿cantly negative again. In addition, the positive sign of the log capital/labor ratio
suggests that capital-abundant non-FIEs tend to have high productivity. By contrast, the
estimated negative interaction term between a ￿rm￿ s endowment and dummy FIE variable
suggests that capital-abundant FIEs are associated with low productivity.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
4.5 Endogeneity
Although tari⁄ reductions are regulated by the GATT/WTO agreements, they are still,
to some extent, endogenous since ￿rms in low productivity sectors would lobby the gov-
ernment for protection (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), which maintains the related in-
ternationally negotiated tari⁄s at a relatively high level. One needs to control for such a
reverse causality to obtain accurate estimated e⁄ects of tari⁄ reductions on TFP. The IV
estimation is a powerful econometric method that can address this problem.24
It is usually a challenging task to ￿nd a good instrument for tari⁄s. Following Amiti
24The IV approach is a good way to control for endogeneity issues. Wooldridge (2002) provides a careful
scrutiny of this topic.
23and Konings (2007), here I adopt a ￿rm￿ s import weighted tari⁄s in 1996 as an instrument.

















the extent of importance of product k for ￿rm i at year t. Therefore, the weighted tari⁄
in 1996 measures how important those tari⁄s were on the products that ￿rms produce
today. The economic rationale is as follows. It is generally di¢ cult for the government to
rid an industry with a high tari⁄ of its high protection status quo ante, possibly because
of the domestic pressure from special interest groups. Hence, it is reasonable to expect
that, compared with other sectors, industries with high tari⁄s ￿ve years before China￿ s
accession to the WTO still have relatively high tari⁄s now. Moreover, an identical line of
tari⁄s on products would have had di⁄erent e⁄ects across ￿rms since a ￿rm might produce
multiple goods.
Several tests were performed to verify the quality of the instrument. First, Columns
(1)￿ (3) of Table 10 were checked to see whether such an exclusive instrument was "rele-
vant". That is, whether it is correlated with the endogenous regressor (i.e., the current
￿rm￿ s weighted tari⁄s). In my econometric model, the error term is assumed to be het-
eroscedastic: ￿ijt s N(0;￿2
ij). Therefore, the usual Anderson (1984) canonical correla-
tion likelihood ratio test is invalid since it only works under the assumption. Instead,
I use the Kleibergen￿ Paap (2006) Wald statistic to check whether the excluded instru-
ment correlates with the endogenous regressors. The null hypothesis that the model is
under-identi￿ed is rejected at the 1% signi￿cance level.
Second, I test whether or not the instrument is weakly correlated with the ￿rm￿ s current
tari⁄s. If so, then the estimates will perform poorly in the IV estimate. The Kleibergen￿
Paap (2006) F-statistics provide strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the ￿rst
stage is weakly identi￿ed at a highly signi￿cant level.25 Third, both the Anderson and
25Note that the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic is no longer valid since it only works under the
24Rubin (1949) statistic (which is an LM test) and the Stock and Wright S Statistic (which
is a GMM distance test) reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cient of the endogenous
regressor is equal to zero. In short, these statistical tests provide su¢ cient evidence that
the instrument performs well and, therefore, the speci￿cation is well justi￿ed.
Columns (1)￿ (3) of Table 10 present the IV estimates by using Olley￿ Pakes TFP as
the regressand. In Column (1), FIEs exclude ￿rms that have investments from H/M/T.
After controlling for the endogeneity of import tari⁄s, the coe¢ cient of a ￿rm￿ s tari⁄ is
signi￿cantly negative and its economic magnitude is much larger than its counterparts
in Table 6. This ascertains that tari⁄ reductions lead to productivity growth. Without
controlling for the reverse causality, the estimated tari⁄coe¢ cient could be underestimated
since low e¢ cient ￿rms could lobby government for protection. I then adopt a broad
category of FIEs in Column (2) to include ￿rms with investment from H/M/T as well as
their interaction term with the capital/labor ratio, but still ￿nd similar evidence to that
in Column (1).
Turning to other control variables, in all the IV estimates the industrial Her￿ndahl
index is negative, although insigni￿cantly. Aside from this, both the ￿rm￿ s markup and
industrial markup show a positive sign, although it is insigni￿cant for the former. This
￿nding, to some extent, is di⁄erent from the traditional wisdom that ￿rms with higher
markups status quo ante have a stronger monopolistic power and thereby should be less
e¢ cient. These unexpected results for such control variables might be because of the lack
of controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects.
Therefore, I control for the two-way ￿xed e⁄ects IV estimates in Columns (4)￿ (6). The
coe¢ cients for almost all variables remain stable across the three speci￿cations. The only
exception is that now the ￿rm￿ s markup is positively signi￿cant. One possible reason for
this interesting correlation is that some other fundamental factors might now a⁄ect both
the ￿rm￿ s markup and productivity. However, this is not the main interest of this paper,
i.i.d. assumption.
25and deserves further detailed exploration. The bottom line here is that, after controlling
for the market structure, tari⁄ production leads to productivity gain, whereas processing
￿rms enjoy extra bene￿t from spillovers. In particular, a 10% decrease in a ￿rm￿ s tari⁄
leads to a 12% increase in a ￿rm￿ s log of TFP after controlling for the reverse causality.
[Insert Table 10 Here]
4.6 Further Estimates of Processing Trade
To completely explore the competition e⁄ect of tari⁄ reductions on a ￿rm￿ s TFP, I take
a step forward to check the heterogeneous competition e⁄ects across di⁄erent types of
processing trade. As introduced above, within the 16 types of processing trade in China
today,26processing exports with assembly and processing exports with imported materials
are the most important. In contrast to other types, processing exports with assembly
are totally duty-free. Once the ￿rm accesses assembly abroad, it immediately enjoys
free duty. By contrast, processing trade with imported materials imports materials from
abroad and has to pay import duty. However, after the value-added products are exported,
the processing ￿rm can receive an import duty rebate from the authorities. Compared
with non-processing trade, this type of processing trade still enjoys the privilege of free
duty. However, compared with processing trade with assembly, it has a higher demand
on a ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow since it requires the ￿rm to pay import duty initially, even though it
eventually has this outlay returned. In this sense, processing ￿rms with imported materials
have relatively lower import costs than non-processing ￿rms but relatively higher import
costs than ￿rms with processing assembly.
If this is correct, by constructing a dummy of processing assembly (i.e., one if a ￿rm
is involved with processing assembly and zero otherwise), the assembly dummy (ASMit)
should have a higher coe¢ cient than that of the processing dummy (PEit) estimated be-
26Other types of processing trade include, among others, foreign aid (code: 12), compensation trade
(13), goods on consignment (16), good on lease (17), border trade (19), contracting projects (20), outward
processing (22), barter trade (30), customs warehouse trade (33), and entrep￿t trade by bonded area (34).
26fore. As shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 11, the coe¢ cient of assembly dummy is
.034 in the IV estimate and .039 in the ￿xed e⁄ects IV estimate, which are both higher
than their counterparts (.028) in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 10. Similarly, by con-
structing a dummy for processing dummy with imported materials (PEIMit) in Columns
(3) and (4), the coe¢ cients in both the IV and ￿xed e⁄ects IV estimates are higher than
their counterparts in Table 10. Finally, by putting these two important processing types
together, the estimates in Columns (5) and (6) still ￿nd a similar ￿nding: ￿rms involved
with these types of processing trade have higher productivity.
[Insert Table 11 Here]
Finally, since most processing ￿rms enjoy (at least nearly) duty-free once involved in
processing activities, the ongoing tari⁄ reductions should have limited e⁄ects on boosting
productivity gain via inducing import competition. In particular, the productivity of
processing ￿rms is expected to increase less than those of non-processing ￿rms via tari⁄
reductions. The reason is that ￿rms would be free of duty charge immediately they become
involved in processing trade. Tari⁄reductions in the period, therefore, have only a limited
e⁄ect on inducing tougher import competition. If this is correct, I should include the
interaction term between the ￿rm￿ s tari⁄ and processing dummy in the regressions.
The ￿rst three columns of Table 12 report the estimation results after including this
interaction term. At ￿rst, it seems that the benchmark OLS and ￿xed e⁄ect estimations do
not support the prediction since the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is still negative and
signi￿cant. I suspect that this is because of the lack of control for the reverse causality of
the ￿rm￿ s tari⁄. Once the endogeneity is controlled, Column (3) shows that the coe¢ cient
of the interaction term ￿it ￿PEit becomes signi￿cantly positive. However, the total e⁄ect
of tari⁄reductions on a processing ￿rm￿ s productivity is still negative (￿1:448+1:124 < 0),
which implies that it still bene￿ts from ongoing tari⁄reductions via the competition e⁄ect.
The reason for this is that some processing ￿rms only just started to become involved with
27processing trade during the period 2000￿ 2006.
My last robustness check is to investigate both the competition e⁄ects and spillover
e⁄ects across di⁄erent processing types. As shown in Columns (4)￿ (6) of Table 12, when
splitting the sample into types of processing trade, the coe¢ cients of the interaction term
￿it ￿ PEit for either type (i.e., processing assembly, processing export with imported
materials, or both) is insigni￿cant, although the coe¢ cient has an anticipated positive sign
for samples with both assembly and imported materials. In any case, all the estimates
suggest that tari⁄ reductions boost a ￿rm￿ s productivity, whereas processing ￿rms are
associated with higher productivity.
[Insert Table 12 Here]
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper is one of the ￿rst to explore the role of processing trade on a ￿rm￿ s productivity
gain. In many developing countries, trade liberalization includes both tari⁄reductions and
processing behavior. In contrast to tari⁄ reductions, which could generate productivity
gain via the international competition e⁄ect, processing export can raise a ￿rm￿ s pro-
ductivity via technological spillovers from abroad. Using the most disaggregated Chinese
data on trade, tari⁄s, and ￿rm-level production, I found that, on average, Chinese ￿rms
enjoy productivity gains from tari⁄ reductions. Moreover, processing ￿rms bene￿t from
additional international spillovers.
This paper enriches our understanding of Chinese ￿rms￿TFP. Possibly because of
poor data quality and restricted methodologies, previous works reported mixed ￿ndings on
China￿ s TFP improvement. By combining the most reliable ￿rm-level production data and
production-level trade data, I could properly measure and precisely calculate a ￿rm￿ s TFP.
The augmented Olley￿ Pakes empirical methodology was applied to deal with the usual two
problems of estimating TFP: simultaneity bias and selection bias. Equally importantly, the
28system GMM approach was adopted to correct for the possible overestimation of capital
elasticity by using this approach. Overall, I found that Chinese ￿rms exhibit increasing
returns-to-scales and their TFPs are signi￿cantly increased.
The paper also has rich policy implications. First, since processing behavior can signi￿-
cantly increase a ￿rm￿ s productivity via technological spillovers, governments in developing
countries such as China might retain an export-oriented development strategy in line with
its own comparative advantage (Lin, 2009; Yao and Yu, 2010). Second, if tari⁄ reductions
can generate productivity gains for both processing and non-processing ￿rms, free trade
would be bene￿cial to domestic ￿rms, even if it intensi￿ed a ￿rm￿ s international compe-
tition. Although today￿ s tari⁄s have been maintained at a relatively low level after many
rounds of GATT/WTO negotiations, a variety of non-tari⁄ barriers are still prevalent
all over the world. In this sense, a further step of trade liberalization is necessary for
producers as well as consumers.
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33Table 1: Basic Summary of Dataset
#. of Obs.a 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Product-Level Trade Data
Transactions 10,586,696 12,667,685 14,032,675 18,069,404 21,402,355 24,889,639 16,685,377
Trading Firmsb 74,225 76,235 68,130 61,017 99,707 118,765 142,273
Total # of Trading Firms (2000-06) (# = 654,352)
Valid Firmsc 21,869 17,485 12,625 15,241 40,143 55,168 55,493
Total # of Trading Firms (2000-06)d (# = 218,024)
Firm-Level Production Data
Firms 162,885 171,256 181,557 196,222 276,474 271,835 301,961
Total # of Trading Firms (2000-06) (# = 1;033;276)
Valid Firmse 43,239 35,374 37,037 53,843 86,477 72,626 104,677
Total # of Valid Firmsf (# = 433,273)
Total # of Merged Firms (# =31,393)
Notes: (a) The source of HS eight-digit monthly multi-product level trade data is China￿ s General
Administration of Customs. The ￿rm-level annual accounting data are from China￿ s National Bureau of
Statistics. The HS six-digit disaggregated annual tari⁄s data are from the WTO. (b) Number of ￿rms
indicates number of trading ￿rms ever reported by the General Administration of Customs. (c) Trading
￿rms refers to the number of trading ￿rms after merging. (d) The total number of trading ￿rms is the sum
of valid trading ￿rms in (b) over the period 2000￿ 2006. (e) Valid ￿rms refers to the number of ￿rms for
merging reported in the ￿rm￿ s accounting dataset. (f) The total number of valid ￿rms refers to the sum of
valid trading ￿rms in (e) over the period 2000￿ 2006. (g) Total number of merging ￿rms indicates numbers
of common ￿rms in both customs and accounting datasets.
34Table 2: Chinese Highly Disaggregated Product-Level Trade by Shipment and by Year
# of Obs. (HS 8-Digit) Year Total
Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (Percent)
10 348,634 534,180 679,058 1,042,585 1,369,341 1,512,498 1,289,312 6,775,608
(2.03%) (3.11%) (3.95) (6.07%) (7.97%) (8.80%) (7.51%) (39.46%)
14 138,380 188,227 194,673 219,349 293,621 297,851 218,479 1,550,580
(0.81%) (1.09%) (1.13%) (1.27%) (1.71%) (1.74%) (1.27%) (9.03%)
15 762,254 881,097 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1,643,351
(4.44%) (5.13%) (9.57%)
99 139,600 146,614 1,048,472 1,320,835 1,615,786 1,631,738 1,298,057 7,201,102
(0.81%) (0.85%) (6.11%) (7.69%) (9.41%) (9.50%) (7.56%) (41.94%)
Total 1,388,868 1,750,118 1,922,203 2,582,769 3,278,748 3,442,087 2,805,848 17,170,641
(%) (8.09%) (10.19%) (11.19%) (15.04%) (19.10%) (20.05%) (16.34%) (100%)
Total Trading Value Total
Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (Percent)
10 1.81e+10 2.57e+10 2.62e+10 4.10e+10 5.68e+10 6.45e+10 3.83e+10 2.71e+11
(1.58%) (2.24%) (2.28%) (3.57%) (4.95%) (5.62%) (3.33%) (23.61%)
14 6.54e+09 8.77e+09 8.32e+09 9.79e+09 2.77e+10 4.45e+10 1.87e+10 1.24e+11
(0.57%) (0.76%) (0.72%) (0.85%) (2.41%) (3.87%) (1.63%) (10.84%)
15 5.32e+10 6.17e+10 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.15e+11
(4.63%) (5.37%) (10.01%)
99 4.35e+09 5.09e+09 7.79e+10 1.19e+11 1.59e+11 1.74e+11 9.76e+10 6.37e+11
(0.37%) (0.44%) (6.79%) (10.36%) (13.85%) (15.18%) (8.51%) (55.53%)
Total 8.22e+10 1.01e+11 1.12e+11 1.70e+11 2.43e+11 2.83e+11 1.55e+11 1.15e+12
(%) (7.16%) (8.82%) (9.80%) (14.79%) (21.23%) (24.69%) (13.48%) (100%)
Notes: Types of shipment: 10 denotes Ordinary Trade; 14 denotes Processing Exports with Assembly;
15 denotes Processing Exports with Imported Materials; and 99 denotes Other Types of Processing Trade.
35Table 3: Average Tari⁄s Clustered by HS 2-digit Industries (%)
Category Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(01-05) Product Duty 22.33 18.24 14.99 13.45 12.21 10.80 11.14
Firm￿ s Duty .94 .11 .08 .16 .12 .09 .28
(06-15) Product Duty 16.66 15.16 11.42 10.99 9.93 9.43 9.52
Firm￿ s Duty 1.56 .58 .51 .36 .41 .40 .54
(16-24) Product Duty 20.23 16.49 14.26 13.42 12.65 11.76 10.32
Firm￿ s Duty 3.33 2.53 1.42 1.24 1.22 1.32 1.63
(25-27) Product Duty 12.25 11.58 7.96 7.65 7.12 6.93 7.00
Firm￿ s Duty 6.19 5.32 4.08 3.73 3.26 3.40 3.47
(28-38) Product Duty 15.16 13.81 9.64 8.84 8.08 7.69 7.64
Firm￿ s Duty 7.87 7.26 5.23 4.96 4.49 4.23 4.51
(39-40) Product Duty 17.53 16.10 11.69 10.36 9.39 8.89 8.96
Firm￿ s Duty 8.33 7.35 5.38 4.71 4.12 3.82 5.80
(41-43) Product Duty 22.42 19.38 15.93 14.61 12.82 12.11 11.75
Firm￿ s Duty 14.25 11.63 8.79 7.87 6.75 6.47 6.54
(44-49) Product Duty 18.34 16.31 12.04 10.46 9.13 8.22 8.49
Firm￿ s Duty 10.64 9.74 7.11 5.59 4.84 4.07 4.58
(50-63) Product Duty 26.79 21.81 17.92 15.69 13.66 12.50 12.47
Firm￿ s Duty 20.10 15.35 12.96 11.28 9.92 9.23 9.40
(64-67) Product Duty 22.88 21.51 18.05 17.10 15.99 15.76 15.26
Firm￿ s Duty 19.17 18.35 17.06 16.36 15.80 15.20 15.48
(68-71) Product Duty 18.98 17.97 14.01 12.87 11.37 10.98 10.69
Firm￿ s Duty 13.08 11.65 8.60 8.00 6.77 6.77 6.71
(72-83) Product Duty 14.56 13.48 10.12 9.38 8.79 8.65 8.80
Firm￿ s Duty 9.27 8.84 6.39 5.71 5.41 5.08 5.34
(84-85) Product Duty 13.59 12.71 7.63 6.61 6.10 5.85 5.84
Firm￿ s Duty 7.36 7.02 4.64 4.18 3.76 3.51 3.62
(86-89) Product Duty 19.71 17.43 15.80 13.66 12.63 12.61 11.78
Firm￿ s Duty 10.18 11.60 7.15 8.01 8.25 6.58 4.88
(90-97) Product Duty 19.12 16.34 12.74 11.39 9.95 9.07 8.97
Firm￿ s Duty 11.63 9.81 7.78 6.41 5.77 4.71 5.00
Average Product Duty 18.53 16.24 12.09 10.66 9.48 8.97 8.87
Firm￿ s Duty 10.76 9.34 7.15 6.33 5.63 5.24 5.62
Sources: Author￿ s own calculation.
36Table 4: Estimates of Olley-Pakes Input Elasticity of Chinese Plants
HS 2-digit Labor Materials Capital
OP GMM OP GMM OP GMM
Animal & Animal Products .058** .053 .887** .970** .047** -.022
(01-05) (3.48) (.87) (55.08) (17.71) (2.52) (-.43)
Vegetable Products (06-15) .007 .031** .891** .571** .048** .019
(.49) (8.55) (69.85) (9.82) (5.93) (.46)
Foodstu⁄s (16-24) .034** -.020 .870** .595** .055** .027
(2.59) (-.25) (67.81) (10.73) (2.28) (.46)
Mineral Products (25-27) .042** .241** .871** .671** .174** .089
(2.07) (3.78) (50.63) (15.51) (3.76) (1.57)
Chemicals & Allied .010 .127** .833** .488 .114** .071
Industries (28-38) (1.44) (1.95) (117.22) (10.99) (10.02) (1.48)
Plastics / Rubbers (39-40) .057** .321** .798** .298** .089** -.003
(7.41) (6.98) (104.04) (4.54) (6.92) (-.08)
Raw Hides, Skins, Leather .104** .125* .804** .738** .045** .043
& Furs (41-43) (7.75) (1.85) (63.86) (11.55) (1.96) (.66)
Wood & Wood Products .031** .041 .859** .266** .007 .118**
(44-49) (3.38) (.46) (96.24) (6.83) (.47) (2.99)
Textiles (50-63) .091** .157** .806** .653** .058** .043*
(21.00) (4.81) (193.88) (22.96) (8.80) (1.95)
Footwear / Headgear (64-67) .071** .138 .857** .703** .037** -.108**
(5.71) (1.62) (70.97) (10.77) (3.94) (-2.38)
Stone / Glass (68-71) .115** .233** .763** .448** .106** .063
(9.36) (3.56) (60.03) (11.58) (10.51) (1.16)
Metals (72-83) .050** .191** .815** .400** .099** .084**
(6.98) (4.22) (126.90) (11.67) (28.52) (2.72)
Machinery/Electrical (84-85) .067** .056 .822** .548** .090** .175**
(13.48) (1.15) (196.42) (13.43) (10.77) (4.97)
Transportation (86-89) .039** .147* .882** .426** .080** .068
(2.62) (1.70) (68.08) (8.81) (2.89) (1.08)
Miscellaneous (90-98) .081** .195** .786** .276** .119** .007
(8.97) (3.58) (95.27) (8.15) (8.38) (.22)
All industries .052** .240** .820** .486** .117** .001
(w/ industrial de￿ ator only) (30.75) (17.05) (493.33) (44.54) (27.08) (.11)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust t-values, *(**) indicates signi￿cance at 5(1)% level.
37Table 5: Summary Statistics (2000-2006)
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HS 8-Digit Product-Level Observations
Product￿ s ID (HS 8-Digit) 17,170,619 6.67e+07 2.14e+07 1031000 9.80e+07
HS 6-Digit AV Tari⁄ 9,851,216 .112 .773 0 90
HS 6-Digit AV Tari⁄ in 1996 (%) 9,196,753 25.538 14.835 0 120
Product￿ s Trading Value (RMB) 16,262,159 70499.77 856771.9 0 4.40e+08
Product Duty￿ s Weighta 16,262,159 .006 .028 0 1
Firm￿ s Weighted Dutyb 9,304,869 .072 .396 0 65
Log Real Materials (M) 17,148,596 18.401 1.836 6.907 24.565
Log Employment (L) 17,170,641 6.254 1.339 2.302 11.907
Lag Real Capital (K) 17,153,244 17.631 1.932 6.907 24.281
Price De￿ ator 9,817,924 .972 .097 .845 2.115
Log Real Sales (Industrial De￿ ated) 17,170,641 11.818 1.797 7.979 17.814
Trading Type 1,0404,300 12.228 4.510 10 39
Firm-Level Observations for Estimation
Year 101,518 2003.491 1.889 2000 2006
Trading Firm￿ s ID 101,518 3.52e+09 8.31e+08 1.10e+09 6.52e+09
Firm￿ s TFP (Olley-Pakes) 101,292 1.188 .349 -1.869 11.501
Firm￿ s TFP (System-GMM) 101,292 7.860 .583 5.215 14.946
Dummy of Processing Firm (PEij) 101,518 .626 .483 0 1
Firm￿ s Product-Weighted Tari⁄ (￿ijt) 101,518 .0667 .0706 0 .802
￿ijt ￿ PEij 101,518 .042 .063 0 .802
Dummy of Exporting Firm (EFij) 101,518 .480 .499 0 1
IV (￿1996
ijt ) 89,494 .255 .143 0 1.198
Firm￿ s Markup in Pervious Year 68,179 1.046 .473 -85.021 47.315
Industrial Markup in Pervious Year 68,180 1.053 .012 .836 1.148
Her￿ndahl Index in Pervious Year 68,180 .001 .003 3.09e-07 .602
ln(K=L)it 101,401 4.195 1.370 -5.777 14.940
SOEs Dummy 101,518 .017 .129 0 1
FIEs Dummy (exclusive H/M/T) 101,518 .332 .471 0 1
FIEs Dummy (FIEit) 101,518 .667 .471 0 1
FIEit ￿ PEij 101,518 .516 .499 0 1
SOEit ￿ PEij 101,518 .007 .087 0 1
FIEit ￿ ln(K=L)it 101,518 2.859 2.337 -5.274 14.940
Trading Type 64,003 14.728 8.744 10 39
Notes: (a) Product￿ s duty weight is de￿ned as the ratio of product￿ s value over ￿rm￿ s over in each
year. (b) Firm￿ s weighted duty at product level is the product of the weight of each product and its duty
at HS 6-digit level.
38Table 6: Benchmark Estimates
Regressand: TFPOP
it OLS Fixed E⁄ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
￿it -.322** -.414** -.423** -.424** -.418** -.426** -.426**
(-22.34) (-21.79) (-22.26) (-22.25) (-12.83) (-13.00) (-13.01)
PEit .015** .021** .033** .033** .028** .038** .037**
(7.00) (8.04) (7.64) (7.57) (6.24) (4.65) (4.58)
(lnK=L)it -.027** -.025** -.024** -.030** -.028** -.026**
(-23.34) (-21.73) (-12.20) (-19.27) (-17.75) (-8.79)
Foreignit .059** .069**
(20.31) (15.25)
FIEit .043** .049** .052** .063**
(10.66) (4.75) (7.68) (4.20)
SOEit -.060** -.079** -.080** -.060** -.085** -.086**
(-5.53) (-5.64) (-5.68) (-3.73) (-3.74) (-3.80)
markupit￿1 .024* .024* .025* .017** .018** .018**
(1.80) (1.83) (1.83) (5.25) (5.54) (5.53)
ind_markupit￿1 -.029 -.036 -.037 .825** .828** .822**
(-.29) (-.36) (-.37) (3.71) (3.72) (3.68)
H erfit￿1 .326 .344 .345 1.089 1.105 1.107
(.99) (1.07) (1.07) (1.43) (1.44) (1.44)
FIEit ￿ PEit -.023** -.022** -.021** -.020**
(-3.96) (-3.88) (-2.10) (-2.01)
SOEit ￿ PEit .035 .035* .062* .062*
(1.63) (1.64) (1.73) (1.74)
FIEit ￿ (lnK=L)it -.001 -.003
(-.60) (-.84)
Firm Fixed E⁄ects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E⁄ects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 101,292 68,041 68,041 68,041 68,041 68,041 68,041
Prob.>F .000 .000 .000
Root MSE .348 .329 .330 .330
R-squared .005 .023 .019 .019 .041 .035 .034
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signif-
icance at the 10(5) percent level
39Table 7: Estimates by Industry
Industries Covered: All Industries w/o High-Tech Textile Machinery
Tobacco & Arms Only Only Only
Method: OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Regressand: TFPOP
it (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
￿it -.423** -.426** -.609** -.604** -.106** -.148** -.650** -.630**
(-22.24) (-13.01) (-8.15) (-6.46) (2.20) (-2.30) (-11.67) (-7.99)
PEit .033** .037** .010 .017 .023** .031** .026** .022
(7.58) (4.58) (.91) (.90) (2.87) (2.15) (2.64) (1.29)
(lnK=L)it -.024** -.026** -.023** -.030** -.042** -.044** -.019** -.024**
(-12.22) (-8.79) (-3.33) (-3.87) (-11.25) (-7.96) (-3.51) (-3.58)
FIEit .048** .063** .043 .024 .112** .079** .098** .076**
(4.72) (4.20) (1.23) (.57) (5.76) (2.75) (3.25) (2.12)
SOEit -.080** -.086** -.126** -.115** -.133** -.165** -.101** -.104**
(-5.68) (-3.81) (-4.20) (-2.20) (-3.85) (-3.00) (-3.99) (-2.34)
markupit￿1 .024* .018** .010 .008 .265** .230** .014 .010
(1.83) (5.53) (1.13) (2.30) (3.67) (6.80) (1.13) (2.57)
ind_markupit￿1 -.036 .821** -.679* .437 -.641* .658 -1.125** -.569
(-.36) (3.68) (-1.95) (.81) (1.92) (1.20) (-3.91) (-1.15)
H erfit￿1 .353 1.118 3.627* .874 -1.233 -4.346 -.279** -.280
(1.09) (1.46) (1.71) (.18) (-.99) (-1.06) (-2.25) (-.49)
FIEit ￿ PEit -.022** -.020** -.002 -.000 -.035** -.038** -.021 -.020
(-3.87) (-2.00) (-.17) (-.18) (-3.08) (-2.02) (-1.49) (-.92)
SOEit ￿ PEit .035* .063* .123** .135* .078 .133* .091** .131**
(1.64) (1.74) (2.92) (1.90) (1.58) (1.71) (2.28) (2.09)
FIEit ￿ (lnK=L)it -.001 -.003 .001 .007 -.017** -.008 -.006 -.001
(-.59) (-.84) (.21) (.84) (-3.42) (-1.22) (-1.05) (-.11)
Firm Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 68,036 68,036 7,940 7,940 12,186 12,186 13,548 13,548
Root MSE .330 .317 .290 .346
Prob.>F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
R-squared .019 .035 .024 .029 .065 .016 .027 .031
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signif-
icance at the 10(5) percent level.
40Table 8: Regressions in Di⁄erence
Regressand: ￿TFPOP
it 1st Di⁄ 2nd Di⁄ 3rd Di⁄
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿￿it -.112** -.114** -.210** -.108** -.160** -.014
(-2.67) (-2.42) (-5.41) (-2.11) (-3.78) (-.24)
￿PEit .003 .009** .011** .010* .015** .016**
(.80) (2.14) (2.53) (1.74) (2.38) (1.97)
￿(lnK=L)it -.049 -.043** -.033**
(-10.29) (-7.94) (-4.92)
￿FIEit -.020 -.033 -.028 -.036 -.001 -.018
(-1.25) (-1.27) (-1.57) (-1.35) (-.05) (-.52)
￿SOEit -.029 -.021 -.042 -.044 -.130** -.159**
(-1.37) (-.80) (-1.51) (-1.47) (-3.53) (-2.95)
￿markupit￿1 -.011** .013 -.001
(-2.39) (1.46) (-.07)
￿ind_markupit￿1 -.387** -.625** -.559**
(-3.72) (-4.47) (-3.44)
￿H erfit￿1 -.229 .041 -.116
(-1.02) (.17) (-.42)
￿FIEit ￿ ￿PEit .022 .033 .041
(.58) (.90) (.72)
￿SOEit ￿ ￿PEit -.163* -.095 -.139
(-1.67) (-1.12) (-1.24)
￿FIEit ￿ ￿(lnK=L)it -.008 .014 .099
(-.33) (.40) (.99)
Observations 67,909 43,989 43,996 26,129 26,113 14,982
Root MSE .363 .346 .389 .371 .389 .378
R-squared .001 .006 .001 .001 .002 .007
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signif-
icance at the 10(5) percent level.
41Table 9: Alternative Estimates on Productivity
Regressand: TFPGMM
it All Industry Assembly No Switchers Interaction
Method: OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿it -.719** -.660** -.663** -.612** -.827** -.207**
(-24.06) (-12.73) (-22.11) (-11.70) (-23.16) (-2.70)
PEit .153** .161** .072** .061** .207** .217**
(21.88) (12.60) (5.04) (2.58) (20.74) (14.93)
(lnK=L)it .242** .236** .249** .241** .229** .235**
(75.94) (50.41) (76.38) (51.38) (57.57) (50.51)
FIEit .112** .116** .158** .160** .045** .129**
(7.23) (4.87) (10.23) (6.82) (2.42) (5.43)
SOEit -.022 -.074 .042** .028 -.058** -.071**
(-.93) (-2.01) (2.26) (1.04) (-2.11) (-1.98)
markupit￿1 .039** .026** .038** .027** .095** .026**
(2.07) (5.12) (2.09) (5.24) (1.97) (5.08)
ind_markupit￿1 -.182 .874** -.164 .747** -.275 .965**
(-1.21) (2.47) (-1.09) (2.10) (-1.53) (2.73)
H erfit￿1 1.506** 3.299** 1.242** 2.562** 1.282** 3.322**
(3.77) (2.71) (2.97) (2.10) (2.97) (2.74)
FIEit ￿ PEit -.059** -.062** -.115** -.107** -.114** -.065**
(-6.76) (-3.84) (-7.28) (-4.03) (-9.16) (-4.04)
SOEit ￿ PEit .087** .208** -.087 -.020 .114** .198**
(2.48) (3.64) (-1.33) (-.19) (2.56) (3.46)
FIEit ￿ (lnK=L)it -.041** -.039** -.045** -.041** -.017** -.042**
(-11.24) (-7.18) (-12.08) (-7.65) (-3.84) (-7.75)
￿it ￿ PEit -.861**
(-8.05)
Firm Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 68,041 68,041 68,041 68,041 49,900 13,548
Root MSE .497 .499 .346
Prob.>F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
R-squared .275 .284 .268 .275 .297 .285
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the ￿rm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signif-
icance at the 10(5) percent level.
42Table 10: IV Estimates
Regressand: TFPOP
it IV IV Fixed E⁄ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿it -1.216** -1.240** -1.240** -1.267** -1.294** -1.294**
(-28.36) (-28.73) (-28.71) (-19.25) (-19.61) (-19.61)
PEit .009** .028** .028** .008 .028** .028**
(2.71) (6.02) (6.02) (1.46) (3.40) (3.34)
(lnK=L)it -.034** -.031** -.032** -.037** -.034** -.033**
(-25.19) (-23.84) (-14.56) (-21.49) (-20.01) (-10.43)
Foreignit .044** ￿ ￿ .041** ￿ ￿
(7.67) (4.48)
FIEit ￿ .037** .036** ￿ .044** .054**
(8.37) (3.29) (6.03) (3.37)
SOEit -.065** -.060** .059** -.086** -.075** -.077**
(-4.42) (-4.07) (-4.05) (-3.25) (-2.91) (-2.96)
markupit￿1 .026 .028 .028 .017** .018** .018**
(1.61) (1.63) (1.63) (5.37) (5.63) (5.62)
ind_markupit￿1 .224** .214* .214* .804** .794** .787**
(2.05) (1.95) (1.95) (3.41) (3.35) (3.32)
H erfit￿1 -.091 -.065 -.066 .290 .344 .348
(-.43) (-.31) (-.32) (.37) (.44) (.44)
Foreignit ￿ PEit .013* ￿ ￿ .031** ￿
(1.93) (2.84)
FIEit ￿ PEit ￿ -.024** -.024** ￿ -.020** -.019**
(-3.92) (-3.92) (-1.93) (-1.86)
SOEit ￿ PEit .021 .001 .001 .056 .035 .035
(.97) (.08) (.08) (1.52) (.92) (.93)
FIEit ￿ (lnK=L)it .000 -.002
(.09) (-.64)
￿1996
it (IV in the First-stage) .266** .251** .252**
(142.64) (121.11) (121.02)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 12395.9y 8664.87y 8657.49y
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 20346.26y 14671.27y 14649.54y
Anderson-Rubin ￿2 Statistic 1080.75y 863.43y 862.41y
Stock-Wright LM S Statistic 1053.07y 836.95y 836.06y
Firm Fixed E⁄ects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E⁄ects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60,749 60,749 60,749 60,749 60,749 60,749
(Centered) R-squared .001 .001 .001 .020 .005 .006
Notes: Robust t-values in parentheses. *(**) is 10(5) % signi￿cance. y is p-value less than 0.01.
43Table 11: IV Estimates by Processing Types
Regressand: TFPOP
it Assembly Imported Materials Assembly&PEIM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿it -1.264** -1.332** -.371** -.406** -1.255** -1.331**
(-29.00) (-20.02) (-8.02) (-7.29) (-28.41) (-20.00)
Assembly (ASMit) .034** .039** ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(3.47) (2.63)
Imported Materials (PEIMit) ￿ ￿ .030** .033** ￿ ￿
(3.02) (2.40)
ASIMit ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .024** .037**
(2.78) (2.64)
(lnK=L)it -.030** -.032 -.027** -.032** -.030** -.032**
(-13.99) (-10.11) (-6.41) (-6.36) (-13.98) (-10.11)
FIEit .029** .047** .120** .121** .031** .046**
(2.63) (3.03) (5.94) (5.01) (2.80) (3.01)
SOEit -.051** -.061** -.086** -.085** -.047** -.062**
(-4.43) (-3.29) (-3.97) (-3.99) (-3.89) (-3.17)
markupit￿1 .028 .018** .017 .017** .028 .018**
(1.63) (5.62) (1.43) (3.88) (1.63) (5.58)
ind_markupit￿1 .216** .767** -.349** .400 .145 .779**
(1.97) (3.23) (-2.18) (1.45) (1.29) (3.28)
H erfit￿1 -.080 .324 .114 .302 -.080 .323
(-.39) (.41) (.69) (.61) (-.39) (.41)
FIEit ￿ ASMit -.009 -.005 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(-.89) (-.34)
FIEit ￿ PEIMit ￿ ￿ -.050** -.055** ￿ ￿
(-4.16) (-3.55)
FIEit ￿ ASIMit ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -.011 -.005
(-1.15) (-.38)
SOEit ￿ ASMit -.046 .051 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(-.95) (.78)
SOEit ￿ PEIMit ￿ ￿ .026 .030 ￿ ￿
(.67) (.76)
SOEit ￿ ASIMit ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -.055 .038
(-1.56) (.73)
FIEit ￿ (lnK=L)it -.000 -.002 -.010** -.009* -.001 -.002
(-.08) (-.63) (-2.20) (-1.69) (-.19) (-.65)
Firm Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 60,749 60,749 17,302 17,302 60,749 60,749
R-squared .001 .015 .003 .003 .001 .015
Notes: Robust t-values corrected for ￿rm clustering in parentheses. *(**): signi￿cance 10(5) percent.
44Table 12: Estimates with Interaction E⁄ect between Tari⁄s and Processing Trade
Regressand: TFPOP
it All Sample ASM PEIM ASM+PEIM
OLS FE IV+FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿it -.287** -.320** -1.448** -.429** -.145** -.453**
(-11.10) (-6.63) (-9.40) (-12.27) (-1.96) (-12.21)
￿it ￿ PEit -.233** -.200** 1.124** -.011 -.068 .109
(-6.37) (-2.97) (6.90) (-.11) (-.72) (1.20)
PEit .048** .050** -.062** .035** .044** .023
(9.43) (5.44) (-4.22) (2.06) (2.19) (1.48)
(lnK=L)it -.024** -.025** -.027** -.024** -.022** -.024**
(-12.16) (-8.78) (-9.12) (-8.34) (-3.12) (-8.36)
FIEit .052** .066** .037** .062** .124** .060**
(5.07) (4.40) (2.47) (4.26) (3.56) (4.11)
SOEit -.078** -.085** -.070** -.061** -.076** -.064**
(5.57) (-3.77) (-2.86) (-3.56) (-2.70) (-3.55)
markupit￿1 .024* .017** .017** .018 .004 .017**
(1.83) (5.51) (5.72) (5.57) (1.55) (5.54)
ind_markupit￿1 -.012 .842** .698** .815 .544 .820**
(-.12) (3.77) (3.07) (3.65) (1.60) (3.67)
H erfit￿1 .347 1.113 .156 1.000 9.831 1.009
(1.07) (1.45) (.21) (1.30) (1.40) (1.32)
FIEit ￿ PEit -.023** -.021** -.017* -.012 -.050** -.006
(-4.07) (-2.08) (-1.71) (-.72) (-2.51) (-.43)
SOEit ￿ PEit .032 .060* .055 .069 .011 .063
(1.48) (1.67) (1.54) (1.04) (.23) (1.18)
FIEit ￿ (lnK=L)it -.002 -.003 .002 -.002 -.008 -.002
(-0.89) (-1.04) (.76) (-.86) (-1.09) (-.80)
Firm Fixed E⁄ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E⁄ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 68,041 68,041 60,749 68,041 6812 60,749
Prob>F (Prob> ￿2) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(Centered) R-squared .002 .03 .033 .026 .033
Years Coverage 2000-06 2000-01 2000-06
Notes: Robust clustered t-values in parentheses. *(**) is 10(5) % signi￿cance . y means the p-value
is less than 0.01.
45Figure 1: Chinese Firm￿ s Productivity and Tari⁄s (2000-2006)




















Notes: Here I drop two outlier of industries: Tobacco (HS code:24) with a maximum of TFP and Arms
(HS code: 93) with a minimum of TFP
Figure 2: TFP and Ad Valorem Duties by HS 2-digit Industry
466 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A: Measuring TFP
Econometricians have tried hard to address these empirical challenges, but were unsuccess-
ful until the pioneering work by Olley and Pakes (1996). In the beginning, researchers used
two-way (i.e., ￿rm-speci￿c and year-speci￿c) ￿xed e⁄ects estimations to mitigate simul-
taneity bias. Although the ￿xed e⁄ect approach controls for some unobserved productivity
shocks, it does not o⁄er much help in dealing with reverse endogeneity and remains un-
satisfactory. Similarly, to mitigate selection bias, one might estimate a balanced panel
by dropping those observations that disappeared during the period of investigation. The
problem is that a substantial part of information contained in the dataset is wasted, and
the ￿rm￿ s dynamic behavior is completely unknown.
Fortunately, the Olley￿ Pakes methodology makes a signi￿cant contribution in address-
ing these two empirical challenges. By assuming that the expectation of future realization
of the unobserved productivity shock, ￿it, relies on its contemporaneous value, the ￿rm
i￿ s investment is modeled as an increasing function of both unobserved productivity and
log capital, kit ￿ lnKit. Following previous works, such as van Biesebroeck (2005) and
Amiti and Konings (2007), the Olley￿ Pakes approach was revised by adding the ￿rm￿ s
export decision as an extra argument of the investment function since most ￿rms￿export
decisions are determined in the previous period (Tybout, 2003)::
Iit = ~ I(lnKit;￿it;EFit); (6)
where EFit is a dummy to measure whether ￿rm i exports in year t. Therefore, the inverse
function of (6) is ￿it = ~ I￿1(lnKit;Iit;EFit).27 The unobserved productivity also depends
on log capital and the ￿rm￿ s export decisions. Accordingly, the estimation speci￿cation
(2) can now be written as:
lnYit = ￿0 + ￿m lnMit + ￿l lnLit + g(lnKit;Iit;EFit) + ￿it; (7)
where g(lnKit;Iit;EFit) is de￿ned as ￿k lnKit+ ~ I￿1(lnKit;Iit;EFit). Following Olley and
Pakes (1996) and Amiti and Konings (2007), fourth-order polynomials are used in log-
capital, log-investment, and the ￿rm￿ s export dummy to approximate g(￿):28 In addition,
since my ￿rm dataset is from 1998 to 2005, I include a WTO dummy (i.e., one for a year
after 2001 and zero for before) to characterize the function g(￿) as follows:









After ￿nding the estimated coe¢ cients ^ ￿m and ^ ￿l, I calculate the residual Rit which is
de￿ned as Rit ￿ lnYit ￿ ^ ￿m lnMit ￿ ^ ￿l lnLit.
The next step is to obtain an unbiased estimated coe¢ cient of ￿k. To correct the selec-
tion bias as mentioned above, Amiti and Konings (2007) suggested estimating the proba-
bility of a survival indicator on a high-order polynomial in log-capital and log-investment.
One can then accurately estimate the following speci￿cation:
Rit = ￿k lnKit + ~ I￿1(gi;t￿1 ￿ ￿k lnKi;t￿1; ^ pri;t￿1) + ￿it; (9)
27Olley and Pakes (1996) show that the investment demand function is monotonically increasing in the
productivity shock ￿ik, by making some mild assumptions about the ￿rm￿ s production technology.
28Using higher order polynomials to approximate g(￿) does not change the estimation results.
47where ^ pri denotes the ￿tted value for the probability of the ￿rm ￿ s exit in the next year.
Since the speci￿c "true" functional form of the inverse function ~ I￿1(￿) is unknown, it is
appropriate to use fourth-order polynomials in gi;t￿1 and lnKi;t￿1 to approximate that.
In addition, (9) also requires the estimated coe¢ cients of the log-capital in the ￿rst and
second term to be identical. Therefore, non-linear least squares seem to be the most
desirable econometric technique (Pavcnik, 2002; Arnold, 2005). Finally, the Olley￿ Pakes
type of TFP for each industry j is obtained once the estimated coe¢ cient ^ ￿k is obtained:
TFPOP
ijt = lnYit ￿ ^ ￿m lnMit ￿ ^ ￿k lnKit ￿ ^ ￿l lnLit: (10)
48